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AbstrAct
Recent years have witnessed increasing volatility in crop prices and yields, fertilizer 
prices, and farm asset values. In this study, the financial performance of illustrative Mid-
west grain farms with different scales, tenure status, and capital structures was exam-
ined under the shocks of volatile crop prices, yields, fertilizer prices, farmland value, and 
cash rent. Illustrative farms of 550, 1,200, and 2,500 acres were constructed reflecting 
the production activity for these farms with three different farmland ownership struc-
tures (15%, 50%, and 85% of land owned) and two capital structures measured by 
debt- to- asset ratio (25% and 50%). Absolute measures and financial ratios were used 
to evaluate the income, cash flow, debt servicing, and equity position of these illustrative 
farms. The “stress test” results suggest that farms with modest size (i.e., 550 acres) and 
a large proportion of their land rented are very vulnerable irrespective of their leverage 
positions. Large- size farms with modest leverage (25% debt- to- asset ratio) that combine 
rental and ownership of the land they operated have strong financial performance and 
limited vulnerability to price, cost, yield, and asset value shocks. And these farms can 
increase their leverage positions significantly (from 25% to 50% in this study) with only 
modest deterioration in their financial performance and a slight increase in their vulner-
ability. These results suggest that the perspective that farmers are resilient to price, cost, 
yield, and asset value shocks because of the current low use of debt in the industry (an 
average of about 13% debt- to- asset ratio for the farming sector) does not adequately 
recognize the financial vulnerable of many typical family farms to those shocks.
Financial Vulnerability of Midwest Grain Farms:  
Implications of Price, yield, and cost shocks
Sasha Li and Michael Boehlje
The U.S. farming sector exhibited very strong 
financial performance during the 2007–2013 
period in terms of cash flow, high incomes, debt 
servicing, and equity accumulation. However, that 
strong performance has been accompanied by 
increased volatility. The increased volatility is a 
result of wide fluctuations in crop product prices, 
input costs, and volatile production due to weather 
events. This volatility has created more opera-
tional and financial risk for farm businesses. Even 
though the variability of prices as a percentage of 
the average price has not changed much compared 
to the past, higher costs and the fixed nature of 
some of these costs has increased the variability of 
both operating margins and net income on both 
an absolute and relative basis dramatically.
The amount of financial leverage (debt relative 
to equity capital) in the industry generally declined 
from 1990 to 2013, with debt to equity falling to 
a low near 13% in 2013. This suggests that debt- 
servicing risk for the sector is less than it was 
in, for example, the 1980s. However, since 2013 
farm debt has once again been rising (USDA- ERS 
n.d.b). While debt levels are still modest sector 
wide, industry averages do not accurately reflect 
the true financial risk for individual farms. Larger- 
scale farmers who have been growing rapidly have 
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leverage positions more than double the industry 
average (Hoppe & Banker, 2010).
Low- interest rates are another factor that may 
be masking the dangers of debt- servicing capacity. 
Interest rates on debt have been abnormally low. 
Rising rates will increase the debt- servicing require-
ments for farmers who have not converted from 
variable to fixed- rate loans. In addition, operating 
credit lines have increased for many producers, and 
interest rates on these loans are reset at renewal 
and thus will increase when market rates rise.
Debt- servicing ability can also be impacted by 
high cash rents. Some farmers have been aggres-
sive in signing high fixed- rate cash rent leases 
(in some cases for multiple years) to obtain con-
trol of land rather than purchase that land, and 
these cash rents have been declining slowly. These 
arrangements result in fixed cash flow commit-
ments irrespective of productivity and prices, 
much like a principal and interest payment on a 
mortgage. Farmers are also facing more strategic 
risks than they have in the past, such as disrup-
tions in market access and in supplier relation-
ships including the possible loss of a lender, loss 
of landlords, regulatory and policy changes, food 
safety disruptions, reputation risk, etc.
U.S. agriculture is notorious for its boom and 
bust cycles. Strong global food demand and 
robust biofuels markets strained global produc-
tion capacity during the 2007–2013 period. The 
prospects of tight global supplies spurred boom-
ing farm incomes. Historically low interest rates 
quickly capitalized these high incomes into record- 
high farmland values. But as with past booms, 
the prospects of a permanent golden era in agri-
culture quickly faded. High farm incomes stimu-
lated world production, and the promise of global 
demand growth rates weakened, resulting in lower 
agricultural commodity prices and incomes. These 
leaner farm incomes were unable to support the 
record- high farmland prices. As a result, many 
farmers who thought they were seizing the emerg-
ing opportunities may be left empty- handed as 
market and financial conditions have changed.
Consequently, farmers, lenders, policy makers, 
and the academic world are asking many “what 
if” questions: What if commodity prices con-
tinue to be depressed? What if seed prices don’t 
go down more or cash rents don’t adjust? What 
if land values decline further? With all the “what 
if” questions in mind, farmers and economists 
are concerned about the incidence and intensity 
of financial stress that the farming sector might 
encounter in the future. The focus of this analysis 
is the implications of the current uncertain market 
and financial conditions on the resiliency and vul-
nerability of Midwest grain farms.
the AnAlysIs
A financial simulation model is used to analyze the 
effect of shocks of crop prices and yields, fertilizer 
prices, farmland value, and cash rent on the finan-
cial performance of Midwest illustrative farms. This 
study focuses on grain farms in central Illinois, and 
the attributes used to classify the farms are size of 
farm, tenure status (percentage of land ownership), 
and debt- to- asset ratios. Previous studies show 
that farms of various sizes, tenure status, and debt- 
to- asset ratios differ from each other in production 
and financial positions and have different capabil-
ities to survive financial stress (Jolly et al., 1985). 
Eight representative farms were constructed with 
different specifications of farm size, percentage of 
ownership, and debt- to- asset ratio. The character-
istics of those eight farms are displayed in Table 1.
Table 2 lists the levels and percentage of assets 
and liabilities on beginning year balance sheets 
of the first year of the simulation period for the 
model farms of 550, 1,200, and 2,500 acres. Each 
of the three sizes of farms displayed in this table 
has an initial debt- to- asset ratio of 25% and a 
farmland ownership percentage of 85%; different 
debt- to- asset and farm ownership percentage are 
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illustrative of farms that have similar asset and lia-
bility compositions (percentages) adjusted for the 
appropriate asset ownership and debt levels. The 
simulation period is three years; @Risk in Excel 
is used for the analysis, with 10,000 iterations for 
each simulation.
The simulation model used to analyze the 
effect of shocks of crop prices and yields, fertilizer 
prices, farmland value, and cash rent on the finan-
cial performance of the illustrative farms requires 
distributions of these variables. Daily corn and 
soybean futures prices data were obtained for the 
December contracts traded on the Chicago Board 
of Trade from 1975 through 2011 (Farmdoc, 
n.d.b). Crop yields measured in bushels per acre 
for corn and soybeans were obtained for the eleven 
Table 2. Starting balance sheets of illustrative farms
01/01/2012
550 Acres 1,200 Acres 2,500 Acres
$ % $ % $ %
Asset 1,167,996  100% 2,310,686  100%  4,589,664  100%
 Current Assets 282,445  24.2% 537,250  23.3% 1,055,955  23.0%
  Cash 55,000  4.7% 85,000  3.7% 180,000  3.9%
  Cash invested in growing crops 8,481  0.7% 17,619  0.8% 59,072  1.3%
  Crop inventory 107,164  9.2% 220,000  9.5% 413,883  9.0%
  Accounts receivable 90,000  7.7% 174,231  7.5% 300,000  6.5%
  Prepaid expenses 21,800  1.9% 40,400  1.7% 103,000  2.2%
 Noncurrent Assets
  Machinery and equipment 266,865  22.8% 413,577  17.9% 771,502  16.8%
  Land 864,765  56.7% 1,886,761  61.1% 3,930,752  63.3%
  Buildings 110,000  9.4% 250,000  10.8% 450,000  9.8%
Liabilities 391,631  25% 793,872  25% 1,591,689  25%
 Current Liabilities 98,684  6.5% 193,576  6.3% 483,293  7.8%
  Operation loan 43,135  2.8% 76,282  2.5% 275,662  4.4%
  Accrued taxes 1,579  0.1% 2,792  0.1% 10,089  0.8%
  Accounts payable 9,773  0.6% 16,678  0.5% 46,705  0.8%
 Current portion of term debt  2.3%  2.5%  1.8%
  Buildings 3,329 7,628 12,259
  Machinery 17,256 26,960 44,903
  Land 14,091 43,727 57,652
 Accrued interest  0.6%  0.6%  0.6%
  Buildings 835 1,914 3,076
  Machinery 1,738 2,715 4,522
  Land 6,948 14,881 28,425
  Noncurrent liabilities (principal 
due beyond 12 months)
 19.2%  19.4%  17.9%
  Buildings 25,704 58,892 94,647
  Machinery 53,469 83,536 139,134
  Land 213,774 14,881 874,615
Equity 776,365  75% 1,516,814  75%
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counties of central Illinois from U.S. Department 
of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistic Ser-
vice (USDA- NASS, n.d.a) through the period 
1925–2011. U.S. farm prices of selected fertiliz-
ers (anhydrous ammonia [NH3], diammonium 
phosphate 18- 4- 0 [DAP], and potash) measured in 
dollars per ton were obtained from the Economic 
Research Service (USDA- ERS, n.d.a) through the 
period 1971–2011. Illinois statewide land values 
and cash rents in dollars per acre from 1970–2011 
were available from the National Agricultural Sta-
tistics Service (USDA- NASS, n.d.b). 
A sequential approach was used to estimate and 
then simulate price and yield observations to ensure 
that the correlations observed among price and yield 
for corn and soybeans along with fertilizer price, 
farmland value, and cash rent remained intact. 
Regression equations were estimated based on a 
prior knowledge and the relationships observed in 
the model input. December corn futures prices and 
soybean futures prices were estimated and sim-
ulated together through the bivariate constant 
conditional correlation autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity process due to the fact that 
futures prices of corn and soybeans were found 
to be highly correlated (Engle, 1982). Based on the 
outcome of the simulated future prices, local cash 
price at harvest time and yield data for corn and 
soybeans were simulated based on the regressions 
fit to available model input data. Spring fertilizer 
prices were then simulated based on the regression 
with corn futures prices, because fertilizer prices 
are correlated with futures prices for corn. In the 
final step, farmland value and cash rent were 
simulated with a model developed based on the 
concept of capitalized future earnings by Feather-
stone and Baker (1988). Details of the estimation 
and the use of those estimated equations in the 
simulation model are provided in Li (2012). Table 
3 lists the mean, standard deviation, maximum, 
minimum, 95% percentile, and 5% percentile of 
the estimated distributions for price and yield of 
corn and soybeans, fertilizer prices, cash rent, and 
farmland price used in the model.
Crop insurance and preharvest hedging using 
futures are implemented in the model as risk 
management strategies. Two insurance options 
are modeled for the illustrative farms: COMBO 
Revenue Protection (RP) and COMBO Yield 
Protection (YP). The insurance premiums for 
the two policies are estimated using the iFarm 
Crop Insurance Premium Calculator developed 
by Farmdoc (n.d.a). Premiums are calculated for 
Woodford County, Illinois, at the 75% coverage 
level; they are $8.76 and $16.02 per acre for corn 
COMBO YP and COMBO RP, respectively, and 
$5.60 and $9.01 per acre for soybean COMBO 
YP and COMBO RP, respectively. A preharvest 
hedge with futures is included in the model. It is 
assumed that 60% of the expected production is 
hedged using December futures contracts for corn 
and soybeans in April in order to protect against 
downside price risk and that the short position is 
offset at harvest time.
The basic structure of the simulation model is 
summarized in Figure 1; a detailed description is 
provided in Li (2012). Cash flow is the key indi-
cator of the farm business’s liquidity and financial 
Table 3. Distributions of stochastic variables
Mean
Standard 





Corn price ($/bu) 4.91 0.25 5.95 3.79 5.31 4.50
Corn yield (bu/acre) 183.73 28.92 303.59 80.77 231.50 136.30
Soybean price ($/bu) 9.65 0.89 14.79 6.36 11.17 8.26
Soybean yield (bu/acre) 52.84 5.67 80.62 31.98 62.27 43.60
NH3 price ($/pounds) 0.32 0.05 0.63 0.20 0.41 0.26
DAP price ($/pounds) 0.32 0.03 0.47 0.21 0.38 0.27
Potash price ($/pounds) 0.26 0.04 0.46 0.03 0.32 0.19
Cash rent ($/acre) 271.96 13.42 359.64 213.00 294.60 251.20
Land price ($/acre) 6067.64 344.63 7803.82 3970.64 6625.00 5502.00
Figure 1. Simulation structure
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Figure 2. Adjustments with insufficient cash balance
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stress status. If a farm business is out of cash, 
it cannot meet financial obligations including 
production expenses, capital expenditures, debt 
payments, and family living expenditures. At the 
end of each year of the simulation period, the cash 
balances of the illustrative farms are evaluated. 
The farms are assumed to have to maintain a cash 
balance higher than a minimum value in order to 
prepay expenses or purchase inputs to maintain 
normal production activities. The minimum cash 
levels required for the illustrative farms are as 
follows: $50,000 for the 500- acre farm, $80,000 
for the 1,200- acre farm, and $170,000 for the 
2,500- acre farm. These cash levels are averages of 
cash holdings on balance sheets of these size farms 
in 2010 as reported in ARMS Farm Financial and 
Crop Production Practices (USDA- ERS, n.d.c).
Farms with an excess cash balance have the 
opportunity to expand the asset base of the busi-
ness. The extra cash is invested in the maintenance 
of machinery and buildings, is used to purchase 
farmland that will improve production potential 
of the farm, or is simply accumulated as cash for 
future liquidity.
Farms with a cash balance that falls below the 
minimum level are regarded as having an insuf-
ficient cash balance. Adjustments are necessary 
to maintain the business and avoid bankruptcy. 
These adjustments are assumed to be implemented 
in a specified order, and after each adjustment the 
cash balance is remeasured to consider the neces-
sity of further adjustments (Figure 2). The hierar-
chy of the adjustments is informed by the study of 
Doye (1986) as follows:
•	 Defer investment in maintenance of machin-
ery and buildings. Investment in maintenance 
of machine and buildings with an amount 
equal to the magnitude of depreciation of 
these two noncurrent assets is assumed to 
be made in a year with excess cash balance. 
When the cash balance is below the mini-
mum level, the investment is deferred into 
future years. The gap between the magnitude 
of depreciation and investment is accumu-
lated until the farm business generates excess 
cash.
•	  Revolving operating line of credit. A three- 
year revolving line of credit is assumed to 
be available for all representative farms with 
insufficient cash balance. Farms can borrow 
funds any time during the three- year simula-
tion period when cash is needed as long as 
the outstanding balance doesn’t exceed the 
credit limit. The credit limit is determined by 
the farms’ net working capital at the begin-
ning of the simulation period.
•	  Decrease family living expense. After the 
revolving line of credit reaches the upper 
limit, farms that still have insufficient cash 
balances are assumed to decrease their fam-
ily living expense to a lower limit, which 
is $67,606, the average noncapital living 
expense for farm households from the Illi-
nois Farm Business Farm Management Asso-
ciation in 2010.
•	  Delay principal payment. The amount of 
cash provided by decreasing family living 
expense is limited. If the farm is still short of 
cash, it is assumed that the owner of the farm 
can negotiate a one- year delay of the princi-
pal and interest payment on term debt. The 
accumulated delayed payment through the 
simulation period cannot exceed one- third of 
the farm’s equity.
•	  Sell farmland and lease back. The opportu-
nity of selling the farmland and leasing it 
back is assumed to be available. The acreage 
that needs to be sold and leased back to cover 
the shortage of the cash balance is calculated 
as the cash shortfall divided by the net price 
of farmland reduced by the deferred taxes.
•	  Liquidate farmland. If selling farmland and 
leasing it back is still insufficient to cover 
cash shortfall, liquidating farmland is the last 
resort for the farm to recover from the finan-
cial difficulties. If all the farmland owned is 
sold and the farm is still short of cash to meet 
all financial obligations, the farm is regarded 
as bankrupt. The acreage of farmland that 
must be liquidated is calculated as the cash 
shortfall divided by the after deferred tax 
price of farmland.
the results
The financial performance of the illustrative farms 
will be evaluated by examining several key finan-
cial characteristics of the farm business. The mean 
as well as the distributions for the following 
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financial measures will be discussed: net income, 
change in net worth, debt- to- asset ratio, term debt 
and capital lease coverage ratio, working capital, 
cash balance, return on equity (ROE), operating 
line utilization, term debt payment delay, and land 
liquidation.
Size of Farm
The results of the financial measures in the last 
year of the three- year simulation period for farms 
with different sizes when the ownership of farm-
land and debt- to- asset ratio are specified to be 
50% and 25%, respectively, are presented in 
Table 4. With 50% ownership of farmland and a 
25% debt- to- asset ratio, farms of larger sizes have 
higher probabilities of a positive cash balance 
and an ROE greater than 10%. Over 98% of farms 
with 2,500 acres have a positive cash balance after 
meeting all financial obligations and family living 
expenses, and 20% of them have a rate of ROE 
over 10%. The mean net farm income of 2,500- 
acre farms is about four times that of 1,200- acre 
farms, while the mean net farm income of 1,200- 
acre farms and 550- acre farms are very similar. The 
variability of net farm income of 2,500- acre farms 
is much higher than that of 1,200- acre farms, 
and 1,200- acre farms have higher variability in 
income than 550- acre farms. The distribution of 
net farm income for 2,500- acre farms is wider 
than f o r  the other two especially on the right 
side, which indicates a higher possibility for larger 
farms to earn higher net farm income.
With higher net farm income, the larger farms 
are able to contribute more to net worth than 
smaller farms. The mean net worth for 2,500- 
acre farms increases by 30% at the end of 
the simulation period, while it increases by only 
7% for the 1,200- acre farms and decreases by 4% 
for 550- acre farms. Although the probabilities of 
negative net farm income for the 550- acre farms 
are low throughout the simulation period (1% 
in year 1, 0.3% in year 2, and 0.7% in year 
3), after subtracting family living expenses the 
probabilities of negative change in earned net 
worth are relatively high for this size farm (65% 
in year 1, 85% in year 2, and 62% in year 3). 
The negative change in earned net worth, together 
with negative change in valuation equity (30% in 
year 1, 33% in year 2, and 34% in year 3 of 
550- acre farms have negative change in valuation 
equity because of expected declines in mean land 
values), significantly depletes the net worth of the 
550- acre farm over the simulation period.
By the end of the three- year period, the mean 
debt- to- asset ratio for all three farm sizes drops 
Table 4. Comparison of farm size with 50% land owned and 25% debt-to-asset ratio
Size of Farm (Acres)
550 1,200 2,500
Annual net farm income (mean) $49,800  $37,600 $166,200
Change in net worth (3 years) (mean) $36,800 $114,900 $926,900
Working capital/value of farm production
Mean 33.0% 45.5% 49.5%
Percent < 35% 57.0%  3.9%  0.1%
Debt-to-asset ratio
Mean 21.5% 15.8% 13.0%
Percent > 55%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%
Term debt coverage ratio
Mean 0.9 1.2 1.5
Percent < 1.1 73.1% 23.9%  2.1%
Percent positive cash 24.6% 83.8% 98.4%
Percent ROE > 10%  0.4%  7.6% 20.1%
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below the initial 25%. But for farms with 550 
acres, 36% have a debt- to- asset ratio greater than 
25% at the end of three years, indicating that over 
one- third of the farms with this acreage increase 
their leverage positions. The percentages of farms 
with 1,200 acres and 2,500 acres that have a debt- 
to- asset ratio greater than 25% are 0.1% and 
0.0%, respectively, which means that almost all 
farms of these two sizes successfully reduce their 
leverage positions during the three- year period. 
For all 10,000 iterations, 100% of farms with 
both 1,200 acres and 2,500 acres have a debt- to- 
asset ratio below 30%.
The term debt coverage ratio (TDCR) reflects the 
capability of the farm business to produce enough 
income to cover debt and lease payments. The 
mean levels of TDCR for 550- acre, 1,200- acre, 
and 2,500- acre farms are 0.9, 1.2, and 1.5, respec-
tively. A ratio of less than 1.1 indicates that the 
farm business has no repayment reserves and thus 
must either borrow money or use open accounts to 
service debt and pay farmland rent. The 550- acre 
farm has a 73.1% probability that the TDCR falls 
below 1.1 at the end of the third year, whereas the 
probabilities for the 1,200- acre and 2,500- acre 
farms to have less than 1.1 TDCR are 23.9% and 
2.1%, respectively.
During the three- year period, over 62% of 
the 550- acre farms use the full operating line of 
credit and have to decrease family living expenses, 
and 30% of them have to delay all term debt 
payments that are due. Liquidating farmland is 
the last choice to avoid bankruptcy; for the 550- 
acre farms, the mean acreage of farmland that 
must be sold and leased back to meet cash flow 
requirements is 1.4 acres, with a maximum of 28 
acres. Over 57% of the 550- acre farms have weak 
liquidity, as indicated by less than 35% WC/VFP, 
and the probability that the farm generates a cash 
balance greater than a minimum level required for 
future normal production activity is only 0.6%.
In comparison, only 11% of the 1,200- acre 
farms use the full operating line of credit; 99.6% 
can repay at least part, if not all, of the term debt 
at the scheduled time, and only 0.4% have to sell 
farmland. Over 16% of 1,200- acre farms generate 
extra cash that improves liquidity or can be used 
to expand the farm business.
For the 2,500- acre farms, the probability that 
the line of credit is fully used drops to only 5%, 
and 0% of them need to liquidate farmland to 
meet financial obligations. Almost 40% of the 
2,500 acre farms generate extra cash; the mean 
extra cash balance beyond the minimum level 
required for future production is $70,000.
Levels of Farmland Ownership
Three different levels of farmland ownership 
(85%, 50%, and 15% of the acreage operated)
for the 550- acre farm with a debt- to- asset ratio 
of 25% are compared in terms of their financial 
performance (Table 5). The 550- acre farms with 
higher percentages of farmland ownership have 
much higher probabilities of a positive cash bal-
ance and an ROE greater than 10%. About 75% 
of farms with 85% farmland ownership have a pos-
itive cash balance after meeting all financial obli-
gations and family living expenses, and 11.7% of 
them have a rate of ROE over 10%. The mean net 
farm income of the 85%- ownership farms is about 
two times that of 50%- ownership farms, while 
the mean net farm income of 15%- ownership 
farms is less than zero. The 85%- ownership 
farms are the only ones that have a mean net 
worth at the end of the three- year period greater 
than the initial value; the mean net worth for the 
85%- ownership farms increases by 7%, while it 
decreases by 4% for the 50%- ownership farms 
and by 21% for 15%- ownership farms.
The ratios of cash rent to value of farm pro-
duction were calculated for 85%- ownership, 
50%- ownership, and 15%- ownership farms. For 
the 15%- ownership farms, the mean ratio of 
cash rent to value of farm production is 42%, 
while the mean ratios for the 50%- ownership 
and 85%-ownership farms are only 25% and 
7%, respectively. On average, cash rent expense 
accounts for half of total production cost for 
the 15%- ownership farm, and in the worst case 
it accounts for 60% of total production cost. 
The amount and variability of cash rent has a 
dramatic impact on profitability and liquidity of 
farms with a low level of farmland ownership.
At the end of year 3, the mean debt- to- asset 
ratio for the 85%- ownership and 50%- ownership 
farms drops below the initial 25%, while the mean 
debt- to- asset ratio for the 15%- ownership farms is 
higher than 25%. About 90% of the farms with 
15% farmland ownership have a debt- to- asset ratio 
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higher than 25% at the end of three years and thus 
are not able to meet all financial obligations without 
borrowing further funds. In contrast, the percent-
ages of farms with 50% ownership and 85% own-
ership with a debt- to- asset ratio greater than 25% 
are 11.4% and 0.9%, respectively. The mean levels 
of TDCR for 85%- ownership, 50%- ownership, 
and 15%- ownership farms are 1.7, 0.9, and 0.6, 
respectively. For the 15%- ownership farms, the 
probability that the TDCR falls below 1.1 at the 
end of the third year is 99.5%; the probabilities 
for 50%- ownership and 85%- ownership farms to 
have less than 1.1 TDCR are 76.8% and 16.2%, 
respectively.
By the end of year 3 over 98.5% of 15%- 
ownership farms use up the operating line of 
credit and have to decrease family living expenses, 
and 85.7% of them have to delay term debt pay-
ments and liquidate farmland. The mean acreage 
of farmland that is sold and leased back is 9.3 
acres with a maximum of 50 acres. Over 99.5% of 
15%- ownership farms have weak liquidity, indi-
cated by less than 35% WC/VFP, and the probabil-
ity that the farm generates a cash balance greater 
than the minimum required for future normal pro-
duction activity is only 0.1%.
In comparison, only 20% of the 85%- ownership 
farms fully use the operating line of credit; 97.8% 
of them can repay at least part, if not all, of the 
term debt due at the scheduled time; and only 
2.2% have to sell farmland. Over 20% of the 
85%- ownership farms can generate extra cash 
that improves liquidity or can be used to expand 
the farm business. For 50%- ownership farms, the 
probability that the line of credit is fully used is 
63%; 32% needed to liquidate farmland to meet 
financial obligations, and 0.8% needed to generate 
extra cash.
Debt- to- Asset Ratios
Controlling farmland ownership at 50%, two 
different levels of debt- to- asset ratios (25% and 
50%) for the 2,500- acre farms are compared 
(Table 6). About 98% of the farms with 25% 
debt- to- asset ratios have a positive cash balance 
after meeting all financial obligations and family 
living expenses, while only 53.7% of farms with 
50% debt- to- asset ratios have a positive cash 
balance. However, farms with 50% debt- to- asset 
ratios have a 41.7% probability of greater than 
10% ROE compared to 21.1% for farms with a 
25% debt- to- asset ratio. The ROE distribution for 
farms with a 50% debt- to- asset ratio is wider than 
that for the 25% debt- to- asset ratio, with both a 
higher maximum and a lower minimum ROE.
Table 5. Comparison of land tenure for 550-acre farms with 25% debt-to-asset ratio
% of Land Owned
85% 50% 15%
Annual net farm income (mean) $98,900 $49,800 -$2,100
Change in net worth (3 years) (mean) $76,000 -$32,300 $130,400
Working capital/value of farm production
Mean 49.6% 32.9% 17.3%
Percent < 35% 9.2% 56.9% 99.5%
Debt to asset ratio
Mean 17.1% 22.1% 32.6%
Percent > 55% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Term debt coverage ratio
Mean 1.7 0.9 0.6
Percent < 1.1 16.2% 76.8% 99.5%
Percent positive cash 74.8% 24.3% 0.3%
Percent ROE > than 10% 11.7% 0.5% 0.1%
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When a farm business’s ROE exceeds ROA, this 
indicates that the farm assets financed through 
borrowing money are generating enough return 
to cover interest costs and generate additional 
profits. The mean ROA for both the 50% debt- 
to- asset and 25% debt- to- asset farms are higher 
than the mean ROE. But for farms with a debt- 
to- asset ratio of 50%, the standard deviation of 
the ROE is 58% greater than that of the ROA. 
This higher volatility in ROE reflects the finan-
cial risks caused by the higher debt level. For 
farms with a 25% debt- to- asset ratio, the differ-
ence between the distributions for ROA and ROE 
is substantially less.
By the end of year 3, 100% of the farms with 
both 25% and 50% debt- to- asset ratios reduce 
their leverage below the initial debt- to- asset levels. 
The mean levels of TDCR for farms with 25% 
and 50% debt- to- asset ratios are 1.5 and 1.1, 
respectively. The 50% debt- to- asset ratio farm has 
a 38.2% probability that the TDCR falls below 
1.1 at the end of the third year; the probability 
for 25% debt- to- asset farms to have less than 1.1 
TDCR is only 2.6%.
By the end of year 3, over 57% of 50% debt- 
to- asset farms have fully used the operating line of 
credit and have to decrease family living expenses, 
but only 0.8% of them have to delay term debt 
payments. About half of the 50% debt- to- asset 
farms have liquidity less than 35% WC/VFP, 
and the probability that the farm generates a cash 
balance greater than a minimum level required for 
future normal production activity is 4%. The 50% 
debt- to- asset ratio farms are able to reduce debt 
loads but are unable to expand the farm business. 
In comparison, only 4% of the 25% debt- to- asset 
farms fully use the operating line of credit, and 
almost all of them can repay most of the term debt 
due at the scheduled time. Over 40% of the 25% 
debt- to- asset farms generate extra cash to improve 
liquidity or expand the farm business.
conclusIon
Recent years have witnessed increasing volatil-
ity in crop prices and yields, fertilizer prices, and 
farm asset values. Farmers and economists have 
been increasingly concerned about the financial 
health of farms that are exposed to various risks. In 
this study, the financial performance of illustrative 
Midwest grain farms with different scales, tenure 
status, and capital structures was examined under 
the shocks of volatile crop prices, yields, fertil-
izer prices, farmland value, and cash rent. Monte 
Carlo methods were used to generate simulated 
crop prices and yields, fertilizer prices, farmland 
Table 6. Comparison of debt-to asset ratio for 2,500-acre farms with 50% of land owned
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
25% 50%
Annual net farm income (mean) $160,500 $134,800
Change in net worth (3 years) (mean) $459,100 $474,900
Working capital/value of farm production
Mean 49.5%  30.1%
Percent < 35%  0.1%  54.4%
Debt-to-asset ratio
Mean 13.0%  35.6%
Percent > 55%  0.0%   0.0%
Term debt coverage ratio
Mean 1.5 1.1
Percent < 1.1   2.6%  38.2%
Percent positive cash 98.1%  53.7%
Percent ROE > 10% 21.1%  41.7%
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value, and cash rent for a three- year projection 
period. Illustrative farms of 550, 1,200, and 2,500 
acres were constructed reflecting the production 
activity for these farms with three different farm-
land ownership structures (15%, 50%, and 85% of 
land owned) and two capital structures measured 
by debt- to- asset ratio (25% and 50%). Absolute 
measures and financial ratios were used to evalu-
ate the income, cash flow, debt servicing, and equity 
position of these illustrative farms.
Given a specific tenure status and capital struc-
ture, the percentage of farms that have a positive 
cash balance after meeting all the financial obli-
gations and family living expenses increases with 
farm size. In fact, almost 75% of the smaller 
farms (550 acres) have a negative cash position by 
the end of the planning horizon. The percentage 
with greater than 10% rate of ROE is also higher 
for larger- acreage farms. Larger farms have better 
profitability measured by net income and operat-
ing profit margin ratio as well as lower volatility 
(standard deviation) of these measures.
At the end of the simulation period, larger 
farms have a higher average WC/VFP ratio, and 
there is a higher percentage of farms with the WC/
VFP ratio exceeding 35% (99.9%) for the 2,500 
acre farms compared to only 43.0% for the 550 
acre farms. Repayment capacity is also higher for 
larger farms (87.9% for 2,500 acre compared to 
22.9% for the 550 acre farms). These results sug-
gest that smaller farms with half or more of their 
farmland rented and even modest leverage (25% 
debt- to- asset ratio), as is typical with  farmers 
early in their farming career, are very vulnerable to 
price, cost, yield, and asset value shocks. Larger- 
size farms with similar tenure and financial char-
acteristics are much more financially resilient.
Different land tenure arrangements have a 
dramatic impact on the vulnerability of the 550- 
acre farming operations. Those 550- acre farms 
with 85% of the land they operate owned farm-
land and are able to accumulate additional equity 
over the three- year period ($26,000) and reduce 
their leverage position from 25% to 17.1%, and 
they have strong working capital and cash posi-
tions. In contrast, farms with only 15% of their 
acreage operated that is owned have negative net 
income ($2,100), lose equity ($130,400), increase 
their leverage position from 25% to 32.6%, and 
have very weak term debt repayment capacity (an 
average TDRC of 0.6, with 99.5% less than 1.1). 
These farms that rent a large proportion of their 
land are very vulnerable to financial stress from 
price, cost, yield, or asset value shocks even with 
crop insurance and hedging strategies in place.
As expected, those operations with higher lever-
age are more vulnerable to price, cost, yield, and 
asset value shocks. For the larger farms of 2,500 
acres with 50% of their land owned, increasing 
the leverage position from 25% to 50% reduced 
income only modestly (from $160,500 with a 25% 
debt- to- asset ratio to $134,800 with a 50% debt- 
to- asset ratio) and equity accumulation even less 
(only $15,800 less change in net worth). Thus, 
larger farms as characterized in this study have 
only modest vulnerability to higher leverage posi-
tions and more resilience to shocks in prices, costs, 
yields, and asset values.
These “stress test” results suggest that the finan-
cial vulnerability and resiliency of Midwest grain 
farms to price, cost, yield, and asset value shocks 
are not surprisingly, dependent on their size, ten-
ure and leverage positions. Farms of modest size 
(i.e., 550 acres) and a large proportion of their 
land rented are very vulnerable irrespective of their 
leverage positions. These same modest- size farms 
are more financially resilient if they have a higher 
proportion of their acreage that is owned rather 
than rented. 
Large size farms with modest leverage (25% 
debt- to- asset ratio) that combine rental and own-
ership of the land they operate have strong finan-
cial performance and limited vulnerability to price, 
cost, yield, and asset value shocks because the cur-
rent low use of debt in the industry (an average 
of about 13% debt- to- asset ratio for the farming 
sector) does not adequately recognize the financial 
vulnerable of many typical family farms to those 
shocks. Stress testing of individual farm businesses 
by farmers and their lenders is essential to accu-
rately assess the vulnerability and resiliency of these 
business and lender portfolios to these shocks.
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